

Sita Ram Kohli Memorial Lectures—1969

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&

some aspects of
ANGLO-SIKH RELATIONS

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K. C. KHANNA
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DEPARTMENT OF PUNJAB HISTORICAL STUDIES
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THE CHARACTER OF LEADERSHIP IN THE PUNJAB AFTER 1839

Before entering into this subject it is necessary to examine the nature of leadership exercised by Maharaja Ranjit Singh during the period of forty years in which he built the powerful kingdom of the Punjab. There is no doubt that he was a born leader of men, a matchless and towering personality, capable of demanding the subservience of all his followers. In ruling over a vast kingdom he chose high dignitaries of state unfettered by consideration of caste, creed or country. He kept them under his control by applying checks and cross checks on their authority. In this way he massed together in his spectacular darbar a heterogeneous body of courtiers who served him faithfully while he lived. As soon as the controlling power disappeared, the darbaris, by and large, succumbed to partisanship and intrigue in the effort to support claimants to the throne and to maintain and enhance their personal interests.

The central features of these intrigues were the determination of Raja Dhian Singh to maintain his power and the efforts of the rulers to establish their authority with the support of anti-Dogra chiefs who were really mindful of their own interests. In this race for power both the parties tried to win over the army. The discipline of the army suffered greatly through democratic control exercised by regimental committees on political changes as well as the deteriorating financial condition which kept the troops in arrears of pay. The history of the years following 1839 is an unbroken record of constantly shifting alliances made by poor leadership which in the effort to sustain itself corrupted the army and involved it in its unprincipled and kaleidoscopic intrigues.

These ten years are replete with examples of what has been stated. Kharak Singh, the immediate successor of the Maharaja, was wholly unworthy of the position he occupied and utterly incapable of dealing with the Dogra Raja Dhian Singh whose

power he wished to reduce by favouring one Chet Singh. Dhian Singh sharply reacted to this position by intriguing with Kunwar Naunihal Singh and by rearing a strong party of the darbaris against the Maharaja. Within less than four months Chet Singh was murdered and Kharak Singh was divested of his authority by his son. The Kunwar disliked the Dogra Raja as much as his father did, even though he realised that he needed him in resolving his difficulties with the British arising out of the conduct of the Afghan campaign.

Not long after Kharak Singh's fall the curtain was raised on the second scene of this eventful drama. Kharak Singh died of persisting ill-health in November 1840, i.e., within a year of his removal from the throne and on the very day on which he was cremated Prince Naunihal Singh met with a fatal accident the cause of which has been unduly attributed by some writers to Raja Dhian Singh.

The Dogra Raja espoused the cause of Sher Singh as against that of Kharak Singh's widow who ruled for less than three months. Mai Chund Kaur replied by intriguing vigorously with a group of rival darbaris including the Sindhanwalias. Dhian Singh and Sher Singh finally sought the support of the troops who did not want the country to be governed by a woman. In this way the stage was set for the siege of Lahore.¹ Even in this episode we get a glimpse of the latent rivalry between Sher Singh and Dhian Singh from the fact that Sher Singh went into action even before the arrival of Dhian Singh from Jammu, probably because he did not want his wazir to have too much of a hand in his eventual success to the throne.

Sher Singh succeeded in January 1841 and he assured Dhian Singh that he would listen to his wazir's advice. He might not have done so but his circumstances compelled him. His position vis-a-vis the troops became very shaky. He had obtained their support on promise of a higher pay, a promise which his limited means prevented him from fulfilling. The result was rioting and plunder in which the more disliked army officers were specially

1. Punjab Intelligence 22nd—25th Nov. (Irid. Sec. Cons. 14th Dec, 1841, No. 87;.

chosen for punishment and disgrace. It was in this manner and at this time that the troops wrested the privilege of presenting their grievances through their chosen representatives.¹ This practice exercised a deep influence on the fortunes of the Punjab. Troops located in the provinces also rebelled and mistreated their officers, particularly the *topiwalas*. Even the Muslim chiefs and zamindars in the north-west became refractory. After the Kabul insurrection of November 1841 relations with the British required a careful handling. In such circumstances Dhian Singh was able to assume almost unlimited powers which he exercised also to promote his family interests. This position continued through 1842. With the approaching termination of the Afghan campaign Sher Singh reverted to his dislike of Dhian Singh and began to think of shaking off the Dogra influence.

Sher Singh's relations with Dhian Singh, having never been really satisfactory, became very strained with the arrival and acceptance of the Sindhanwalias at the instance of George Clerk, the British Political Agent. Gradually, the party against Dhian Singh gathered strength; only the troops believed that they would be paid regularly only so long as Dhian Singh remained in power. Dhian Singh was not the man to be caught napping. He set about to intrigue against the Maharaja by winning over the Sindhanwalias. The latter were already in the confidence of the Maharaja against his wazir. These intrigues and counter-intrigues resulted in the Sindhanwalias removing both the Maharaja and the wazir in September 1843. It is possible that the murder of Dhian Singh was an after-thought suggested by the sardars inimical to the Dogras. In any case these murders were the beginning of worse things to follow.

Hira Singh with the help of the army on his side, made short work of the Sindhawalias (except Attar Singh) and the anti-Dogra sardars like Bhai Gurmukh Singh and Misr Beli Ram.

1. Punjab Intelligence, 20th—23rd Jan. (ind. Sec. Cons. 8th Feb. 1841, No. 97) Punjab Intelligence, 23rd—30th Jan. (Ind. Sec. Cons. 22nd Feb. 1841, No. 92. Punjab Intelligence 1st—7th Feb. (Ind. Sec. Cons. 1st March, 1841. No. 13.) Punjab Intelligence, 8th-15th Feb. (Ind. Sec. Cons. 8th March, 1841, No. 92.) Clerk to Muddock, 8th Feb. (Ind. Sec. Cons. 22nd Feb. 1841, No. 91)

But the forces mustering against him were too strong to be ignored. Jawahar Singh, the uncle of the young Maharaja Dalip Singh, Dogra Raja Suchet Singh, his own uncle, the Princes Kashmira Singh and Peshora Singh, Attar Singh Sindhanwalia, and above all, the dissatisfied troops who had not been given the higher pay promised to them—all these hostile elements began to operate against him. Hira Singh's only hope of strengthening his position lay in the continued support of the army which held the balance power and was in no mood to give its constant and unqualified support to either party. Hira Singh used the hostile feeling of the troops to do away with Raja Suchet Singh and Attar Singh Sindhanwalia, but he found it impossible to collect the arrears of revenue from the defaulting sardars in pursuance of Jalla's advice. And in fact it was this inability to cross the financial hurdle which finally brought him and his adviser to their doom in December 1844.¹ We should not under-estimate the manoeuvres of Raja Gulab Singli in avoiding to pay his arrears and strengthening his position in the hills to achieve his objective even at the cost of his nephew.

Political murders carried out with the help of troops created conditions of grave instability. A Council of Regency was now established to rule in the name of the young Maharaja, but there was no power in the darbar to withstand the rising influence of the army. As the financial position worsened, the army used Peshora Singh as a lever to bargain for payment of arrears. The darbar could hope to pay only if Gulab Singh was brought down on his knees and made to pay his dues. For a while the campaign in the hills against him seemed to go on well, but Gulab Singh bribed his opponents right and left including the Panches and got off lightly. He was brought down to Lahore where he used his superior powers of intrigue to discredit Jawahar Singh after the latter had managed to get Peshora Singh removed out of his way. The fury of the troops now expressed itself by publically beheading Jawahar Singh on 21st September, 1845.

1. Broadfoot to Currie, 14th Nov. (Ind. Sec. Cons. 25th Dec. 1844, No. 96, Same to same, 10th Nov. (Idem, No. 92).

The army was now supreme. Realizing that Rani Jindan and her wazir Lai Singh, being incapable of handling the troops and failing to reach some kind of a settlement with the British, would seek their escape in exciting them to seek military conclusions with the British, Gulab Singh went away to the hills as his stay in Lahore at that time would involve him in matters he wished to avoid. The war was now quite within sight.

What has been stated so far throws a lurid light on the character of leadership in the post-Ranjit Singh years. Those who succeeded to the throne were not capable of dealing with the situation. They needed the Dogras to conduct steady relations with the British and yet they were keen to reduce their power by intriguing with the darbaris who were hostile to the Dogras. The ruling party (except perhaps Kunwar Naunihal Singh), was ill-matched in its struggle with the Dogras. The darbaris, by and large, were governed by motives of self-interest. Party alignments were influenced by the possibility of safeguarding and, if possible, augmenting their jagirs. Loyal service to the state failed to become the guiding factor of the policies they supported. By not paying the large arrears of revenue due from them they accentuated the financial decline of the state. The rulers on the one hand sought the support of the troops by increasing their pay and on the other found themselves unable to pay the arrears in an increasing degree. The net result was the domination exercised by the troops on the affairs of the state. Finally, the only way in which the darbar could deal with an undisciplined army was to encourage it in the growing spirit of hostility against the British. The weapon which Maharaja Ranjit Singh had forged as an instrument of strength of his kingdom became a source of danger to its existence.

Speaking of the domination of the army, it sounds paradoxical, but it was true, that the powerful but unitelligent army itself destroyed the only chance it had of finding means for its payment by realizing arrears from Gulab Singh. Success against the Jammu Raja would in all probability have resulted in the collection of arrears from other defaulters as well. But the soldiers and especially their representative leaders were led away by temporary gain.

The increase in the army had been effected mostly in Sher Singh's reign and during the wazarat of Jawahar Singh. The infantry increased from 20-30 thousand in the reign of Ranjit Singh to 55-70 thousand in the period of Jawahar Singh. The expenditure increased in round figures from one crore and eleven lakhs before 1839 to two crores and forty six lakhs in Jawahar Singh's time. The expenditure on the civil administration, on the other hand, fell from 41 lakhs before 1839 to 38 lakhs in 1845.¹

Apart from the increase, the army had grown republican in spirit and organization. Each regiment of the regular army had its own Panchayat composed of deputies from companies, and these, and sometimes the whole regiment decided all questions regarding the corps. Punishment could only be inflicted with their consent. In addition to the Panchayats, each company had two *chaudhris*, elected by themselves. The Panchayats represented the army in the darbar, but they could not do anything without the approval of the *chaudhris*, who were usually private soldiers, independent of the darbar and unknown to it. The darbar could not even enquire their names.²

The soldiers enjoyed many privileges. They had been guaranteed the *assami* or hereditary right to their office. All cases were now tried before their own tribunals with the result that hardly any crimes were punished unless the *chaudhris* insisted on punishment. The *chaudhris* gave home-leave to the soldiers without even informing the officers. Exercise and drill were disused and the artillery cattle were so neglected that they could hardly move the guns. Many officers of the irregular army had been beaten in the provinces and were made to pay heavy sums for being allowed to stay in office. The regular

1. The figures quoted here may not be absolutely accurate, but there can be no doubt about their general reliability. These are based on various abstracts supplied to the British Government and also on a comprehensive document supplied by Henry Lawrence in 1847 together with his opinions as to the possibility of balancing the Punjab budget.
2. Broadfoot to Currie, 16th Jan. (Tnd. Sec. Cons. 4th April, 1845, No. 102)
Political Agent to Government, 26th Jan. (Idem, No. 111)

officers only gave the order of command on parade but otherwise they had no contact with the men. They could neither punish nor reward them. The Panchayats and the *chaudhris* had appropriated all the more important functions of the officers and were the real leaders of the army.¹

The influence of such an army as a servant of the Khalsa was nil but as a master of the Khalsa was profound. It did not require a prophet to forecast the doom of such an army and the fate of the kingdom it was expected to serve.

It would be necessary to emphasise that while poor leadership failed the kingdom by its incapacity, greed and disloyalty, the common Sikh soldier was not altogether ruled by considerations of higher pay. The troops no doubt clamoured for it and for payment of their arrears on* every important occasion when their services were required. Their regimental committees, the Panchayats, no doubt refused to carry out orders until a bargain had been struck. At the same time when the troops were convinced of the hostile designs of the British, which the leaders in power exploited, they were fired by a genuine spirit for resistance. The British had arranged for a pontoon bridge at Ferozepur. They had moved up large numbers of troops towards the frontier posts. They had declared that the Sutlej was an inviolable frontier.² They had reduced the status of the Cis-Sutlej territories and disallowed their normal administration by the darbar. The forthcoming war with the Sikhs was a common subject at mess tables in north India. In fact they were preparing to conquer the Punjab. The troops were fired by the spirit of defending the Khalsa Commonwealth (Sarbat Khalsa) at any cost. They were prepared to fight to the last. It was tragic that their rulers and military leaders except Sham Singh Attariwala were not actuated by such high motives. Distrusting the leadership of Lai Singh and Tej Singh who were known to be disloyal, the army was anxious to invite Gulab Singh, but the latter was biding his time. So a halting advance to the Sutlej was made which resulted in the Sikh forces crossing the Sutlej

1. Idem.

2. Ellenborough to Lord Fitzgerald, 31st Jan. 1843. (Ripon Correspondence, Br. Mus. Add. Mss. 40864, pp. 16-17)

on the 11th December and the declaration of war by Hardinge on the 13th.

The conduct of Sikh leaders during the war was most unworthy. Bhai Ram Singh's letter to the Political Agent at Ludhiana informing him by a special courier about the decision of the darbar to go to war,¹ Tej Singh's decision not to attack the Ferozepur garrison and not to prevent the passage of Sir John Littler and to join the action at Ferozeshah in a belated manner and not to inflict a crushing blow on the enemy, his disloyalty in informing the British about the position of gun entrenchments at Sobraon and finally his action in fleeing on the first assault and in overturning one of the boats and breaking the line of escape and thus obliging the Sikh force to fight with its back to the river, Gulab Singh's policy to play a double game in order to profit by whatever happened,² all these facts present Sikh leadership to us in a most despicable light and we are obliged to say, "Woe to the kingdom which is governed by such unworthy and disloyal leaders."

The sum total of the happenings during the six years 1839-45 leads us to the view that the quality of leadership was poor and totally inadequate for the task of maintaining the Punjab in a state of independence or fighting for it successfully in war.

1. Lai Singh's half-hearted engagement at Mudki.
2. Hardinge to Kipon. 3rd Feb. 1846 (Ripon Correspondence. Br. Mus. Add. Mss. 40875, pp. 58-67)

THE EFFECT OF THE TREATIES OF 1809 AND 1838 ON ANGLO-SIKH RELATIONS

The Treaty of Amritsar formed in 1809 was formed by the British Government under the stress of the Franco—Russian alliance (1807-1812). Maharaja Ranjit Singh agreed to it after much hesitation. By Article 1 the British Government undertook to have no concern with Ranjit Singh's territories to the north of the Sutlej. By Article 2 the Sikh ruler agreed that he would never maintain in his Cis-Sutlej territories more troops than were necessary for the internal duties of his possessions and would never encroach on the rights of the Cis-Sutlej chiefs. This treaty comprising 4 Articles, one of the shortest and most important, remained unbroken for over thirty-five years.

The Tripartite Treaty of 1838 was also foimed at the initiative of the British Government which was now anxious to stem Russian advance by creating a second buffer in Afghanistan. The negotiations with Dost Mohammad proving difficult on account of his insistence to take back Peshawar from the Sikhs, which the British could not countenance for fear of losing Ranjit Singh's friendship, it was planned to support Shah Shuja and to place him on the throne at Kabul. Ranjit Singh could never think of doing this by himself, but with an assurance from the Government that they would take the major share in this project and that Shah Shuja would agree to the Sikh claims on either side of the Indus from Kashmir to Amarkot and that the darbar would be given 15 lakhs in settlement of its claims on the Amirs of Sindh and two lakhs for maintaining a contingent of Muslim troops at Peshawar in support of the Shah, he agreed to join this venture. This unfortunate treaty ended with the murder of Shah Shuja in April 1842 and all ideas on the part of the Sikh darbar and the British Government to revise it in an altered form failed

on account of the fluid and changing political position in respect of Afghanistan.

Both these treaties had been initiated by the British Government to strengthen the cause of political security and military defence by creating a double buffer against the danger of advance by a European power. It was also hoped that the navigation of the Indus would open up vast possibilities of trade. But both had been formed under the stress of circumstances and were indeterminate in character. They were formed on the basis of certain assumptions and implications which did not hold good throughout the period of their observance. In particular, the indefiniteness of the clauses relating to the territorial rights of the darbar led to misunderstandings and mutual suspicions. We must therefore analyse their execution by both the parties in some detail before we can assess their significance in Anglo-Sikh relations.

The clause relating to the Cis-Sutlej possessions of the Lahore darbar was found to be indefinite, the problems arising out of this indefiniteness were solved amicably without causing offence to the Maharaja, who on his part was prepared to accept working compromises in the spirit of the treaty⁷ of friendship he had formed. The Treaty of 1809 followed by an *Ittila Nama* protected the Cis-Sutlej chiefs against Ranjit Singh and two years later the chiefs were protected against one another by another proclamation.¹ Originally, they were allowed to exercise their former authority on the view that the number of such chiefships between the Jamna and the Sutlej was small. Later experience belied this view and showed that apart from the chiefs who were dependent on the British or on Ranjit Singh there were others whose dependence had not been decided. Subdivisions of territories and escheating heirless estates created difficulties in all those cases in which the dependents of the darbar possessed any rights. As the years passed, the sovereignty of the British became more effective but the procedure adopted was irregular owing to the original indeterminate position.² The posi-

1, Aitchison, Vol. I, pp. 156—158.

2. Resident at Delhi to Government, 30th Sep. (Beng, Pol. Cons, 14th Nov., 1828, No. 3). Broadfoot to Currie, 1st April (Ind. Sec. Cons. 20th June, 1885. No, 86;

tion of the Cis-Sutlej possessions of the darbar was still more indefinite. It appears that in order not to jeopardise the formation of the treaty in 1809 this aspect was deliberately left undefined. Was Ranjit Singh as ruler of his Cis-Sutlej possessions subject to British protection or did he hold independent sovereignty as in the rest of his kingdom to the north of the Sutlej ? All the available evidence on this point shows that he was treated in a class by himself and it was hoped that difficulties, if they arose, would be settled in a friendly spirit.

This question was debated in a large body of correspondence during 1826-28 after Ranjit Singh had appointed Wade, the Political Agent at Ludhiana, to act as superintendent of his Cis-Sutlej territories. Without going into details of how satisfactorily the Maharaja's claims were decided in regard to (1) the fort of Wadni bestowed by Ranjit Singh on his mother-in-law, (2) the political dependence of Fateh Singh Ahluwalia and the Nawab of Mamdot, who held territories on both sides of the Sutlej, (3) the claim of the darbar to Ferozepur and the lands around it, and (4) the darbar's claim to Machhiwara and Anandpur Makhwal, it would be well worth quoting the decision of the Government relating to other places in dispute conveyed to the Resident at Delhi in 1828:

'The other places in dispute appear to possess little value either present or prospective, and as the point of right in each case is more or less doubtful, the Governor-General in Council conceives that we shall do best to desist from contending with Ranjit Singh the question of supremacy in these several estates and villages/¹

In pursuance of this friendly policy, Ranjit Singh's claims, such as they were, were satisfactorily settled. For instance, he was allowed to resume Gujarwal from the Chief of Kaithal.

It is undoubtedly true that Ranjit Singh was more interested in his revenue of about Rs. 3 lakhs from his Cis-Sutlej possessions than in defining their political status. The *vakils* posted by him in these possessions settled all business amicably without

1. Government to Resident at Delhi, 14th Nov. (Beng. Pol. Cons. 14th Nov. 1828, No. 4)

causing him any embarrassment. But it is more than doubtful whether Ranjit Singh would have accepted the position of a protected chief which was assigned to Maharaja Dalip Singh within five to six years of his death.

The growing anarchy in the Punjab and the developing military measures undertaken by the British in pursuance of their policy of "the inviolability of the Sutlej frontier" were deeply inter-related and brought the question of the status of the Cis-Sutlej possessions into high relief. The available evidence shows that Major Broadfoot, the new Political Agent, aggravated the position by emphasising his personal interpretation of the nature of these possessions. It is certain from an examination of the correspondence on the subject between the Governor-General and the President of the Board of Control in England that the highest British authorities concerned were uncertain about the kind of relationship of these possessions which Broadfoot visualised.¹ They held the view that Ranjit Singh's Cis-Sutlej possessions involved no rights of sovereignty but that his successors would also be acknowledged as successors to his rights in these possessions. At the same time, Lord Hardings in his correspondence with Lord Ripon, the President of the Board of Control, admitted that the correspondence on the subject was loose and indefinite and that there was a certain degree of "obscurity and contradiction" but he stressed the advantage of regarding these possessions as "family property." At first Ripon in reply stated "My ambition as to the Punjab territories is limited to that portion of them which may be situated on our side of the Sutlej and thus it would doubtless be very useful to us to have." Otherwise Ripon was averse to a general war, as appears from his remark, "pray, keep us out of a war and a conquest." George Clerk, at that time in England, advised Ripon differently. He stated, "I, therefore, do not think it would be credible for us to affect now to discover a less permanent tenure to be vested in the Sikh Government over them (Cis-Sutlej territories) than over the territory of the Punjab."² Then Ripon revised his previous view and

1. Ripon to Governor-General, 23rd May, 7th June and 24th June, 1845, (Ripon Correspondence, Br. Mus. Add. Mss. 40872, pp. 132-35, 206-229 and 222-225)
2. Clerk to Ripon, 22nd May, 1832. (Idem, pp. 124-129)

expressed to the Governor-General his reluctance to set up new or untenable points in getting the Cis-Sutlej territory, however important it might be. Later still, while communicating the view of the Cabinet about the indefinite nature of the possessions, he left the final decision to Hardinge but indicated the desire to avoid war as far as possible. A month later he made his instructions to the Governor-General more explicit by saying, "We nevertheless are quite prepared to give *carte Manche*" and to support your decision, whatever it may be."¹

Broadfoot the Political Agent continued to take a very drastic and conservative view of this matter. He argued that the second article of the Treaty of 1809 relating to the Cis-Sutlej territory described the darbar's rights in language which might be applied "to a Bengal Zemindar having the police management of his estates/' He had no doubt that the Cis-Sutlej possessions of Lahore were subject to British sovereignty like other protected Sikh estates.² Broadfoot not only held this arbitrary view but he also enforced it with vigour. He took exception to the terms *moomalik muhroosa* (hereditary possessions) used by the darbar with reference to these territories. The government of India tried to check him because it thought differently in regard to this matter and wanted to show forbearance. Broadfoot, however, continued to act on his own view.³ He required the *vikils* of the darbar to supply grass and fodder to the British Government like other protected chiefs. The unfortunate part of the position was that, unlike Wade and Clerk, Broadfoot had no personal contact with the dignitaries of the darbar. He depended entirely on official correspondence. The Sikhs were consequently left to themselves to draw their own conclusions from the purely business-like proceedings of the British Agent. They believed that by enforcing certain drastic restrictions and neglecting past practice the British Government intended to break the Treaty of 1809 and was wholly unjustified in amassing large bodies of troops

1. Ripon to Hardinge, 7th July, 1845 (Ripon Correspondence, Br, Mus. Add. Mss. 40873, pp. 32-37)
2. Broadfoot to Currie, 1st April (Ind. Sec. Cons. 20th June, 1845, No. 36)
3. This information is scattered in documents of Ind. Sec. Cons 15th Aug. 1845, Nos. 41-49

on the frontier and making other war-like preparations on the ground that they were purely of a defensive nature.

Deterioration in the Punjab had no doubt led to disorders in the Cis-Sutlej possessions. When the darbar wanted to improve things by sending fresh *sowars*, Broadfoot's reply was that not a single *sowar* would be allowed to cross the Sutlej. Baba Bishan Singh Bedi, however, crossed the Sutlej with 200 *sowars* before Broadfoot's reply had been received but Broadfoot took prompt measures to disarm the leaders and make the rest of the party recross the Sutlej. Likewise, Sardar Lai Singh Adalti, appointed to administer Kot Kapura, was not permitted to go with his party to carry out his assignment. Broadfoot could justify his policy as a measure of expediency but the darbar felt the imposition of such restrictions as new, irksome and unreasonable. This new position being utterly unacceptable, Jawahar Singh began to oppose Broadfoot. He ordered a *Parwana* to the wakil to be drafted in which all such grievances were detailed. In this Maj. Broadfoot was accused of having created all the difficulties and if he did not permit Lai Singh Adalti to cross the river, the darbar would begin to deal directly with the Governor-General. Further, in his reply to a letter from Broadfoot Jawahar Singh wrote "that no further concession was to be accepted and in a few months 1,25,000 soldiers would be assembled at Lahore."¹ The tension created by these divergent views of rights relating to the Cis-Sutlej territories was made more acute by Jawahar Singh's failure to obtain for the darbar Suchet Singh's treasure at Ferozepur, although the British Government in England was clearly of the view that it should not retain it.

Let us now turn to an analytical study of the Tripartite Treaty of 1838. Having conquered Peshawar in 1818 Ranjit Singh had entrusted it to the Barakzai feudatories. After making a treaty with Shah Shuja in 1833, he immediately proceeded to annex Peshawar and withstood attempts made by Dost Mohammad of Kabul to recover it from his hands. As Dost Mohammad began to look towards Russia and Persia for an alliance, the

1. Broadfoot to Currie, Simla, 13th Sept. (Ind. Sec. Cons. 20th Dec, 1845, No. 112)

British proceeded to form the Tripartite Treaty with Shah Shuja the exiled Afghan ruler and Ranjit Singh as partners. This Treaty was based on the former Treaty of 1833 between Ranjit Singh and Shah Shuja.

Like the Treaty of 1809 this Treaty also included clauses dealing with territorial rights and claims of Maharaja Ranjit Singh across the Indus which led to a great deal of trouble during the conduct of the first Afghan war. Article 1 of the Treaty guaranteed to Ranjit Singh territories lying on either bank of the Indus, in fact all that he possessed or hoped to possess at the time from Kashmir in the north down to Amarkot in the south. Indefinitely worded as it was, this article included expressions like "and on the right bank Peshawar with the Eusufzaee territory, the Khutuks and all places dependent on Peshawar, as far as the Khaibar Pass." It became most difficult to determine the nature of Sikh sovereignty or dependency in that area at that time. Again, the Persian text of the Treaty became even more difficult of interpretation on account of the inclusion of a phrase like "Peshawar with Eusafzaees etc.," It was wrong to have assigned people to the darbar whose migration was never admitted precisely. The use of an 'etc' implied that the darbar could complete the extension of sovereignty over such areas as were in the process of being included at the time when the Treaty was formed. Again, the darbar construed the phrase, "upto the boundry of the Khaibar" to mean that it could continue to collect revenue from the few miles of the country between Jamrud and the mouth of the Khaibar.

It was all very well to have included such claims in the Treaty, but difficulties soon arose when Macnaghten, like Broadfoot in the other case, held that the Sikh claims were inadmissible and in any case should be settled later by mutual arbitration. We notice that when Avitabile, the Sikh Governor of Peshawar, enforced Article 2 in the Treaty by collecting revenues from areas from which Kabul had never collected before, the British politicals influenced by the requirements of the Afghan campaign, began to overlook or put aside temporarily the claims of the Lahore darbar.¹ They leaned so heavily on the Afghan side that Macnagh-

1. Clerk to Maddock. 22nd May, Punjab Government Records, North-West Frontier Agency, 1840, Book 149, No. 24)

ten became suspicious of the Sikhs and his assistant Mackeson even recommended the taking of Peshawar in the interest of the campaign. The degree of sovereignty exercised by the darbar over Swat, Bunair and Panjtar was not defined in 1838. It continued to be a source of endless correspondence during the campaign.¹

By Article 3 the British were required not to march any troops through the Punjab and across the Indus without permission from the Maharaja. It was hoped that the permission given to the convoy of Shahzada Taimur to march through the Punjab at the beginning of the campaign while the main army of the Indus marched by the longer route through the Bolan Pass would not be repeated. The unforeseen developments of the Afghan War necessitated that troops should march through the shorter route of the Punjab. The reluctance with which the darbar agreed to these movements at different times conveyed a feeling of suspicion that the Sikhs did not wish to cooperate fully. At the later stages the passage of troops was taken for granted and escorts and private traders were freely allowed to cross the ferries without the permission of the darbar. The general feeling of the darbar in the darbar was one of dislike. Clerk believed "that the sacrifice of independence involved in the concession of such a privilege, if indispensable to the British Government, would essentially alter the relative positions of the two states, to a degree, indeed, that can only result from the terms of a new Treaty."² The blame for such a situation really attaches to the British Government which did not take the darbar into full confidence about the military needs of this campaign.

By Articles 13 and 15 of the Treaty the darbar was expected to maintain at Peshawar a contingent of 5000 Mohammadan troops who might be required to go through the Khaibar as far as Kabul, as required by the needs of the expedition determined by the British Government and the darbar. In return for this Shah Shuja was to pay rupees 2 lakhs a year during the observance of the Treaty. This contingent was not always

1. Clerk to Government, 28th Sep. (Ind. Sec. Cons. 18th Dec. 1839, No. 55)

2. Same to same, 14th Sep. 1829 (Ind. Sec: Cons. 20th April, 1840, No. 88)

maintained at full strength and British opinions varied about the service it rendered. The Sikhs differed from the British in the manner in which the passage through the Pass should be effected. They understood the temper of their troops and were opposed to forcing a passage through the Pass. Gulab Singh, in particular, was more inclined to purchase the neutrality of the Afghan tribes in the Khaibar. In the view of the British, the military arrangements designed by them, particularly after the Kabul insurrection, did not receive the full cooperation of the darbar and it became necessary for Sir Henry Lawrence to hold some kind of a promise of consideration and patronage to Raja Gulab Singh before the contingent could be made ready. The fact was that for various reasons the Muslim Najibs provided by the darbar were not willing to proceed into the Khaibar. It was not realised by the British that the religious antipathy between the Sikhs and the Muslims was not in the interest of a joint military action in the Khaibar.

The most unfortunate part of the campaign was that Ranjit Singh died within a year of making the Treaty and within a few months of the beginning of the expedition. The British kept the interests of the Shah in front as the main object of the expedition and this the Sikhs did not like. They controlled policy and did not discuss its changing aspects with the darbar as visualised in Article 15 of the Treaty. It resulted in a loss of faith between the British and the Sikhs, which affected their relations adversely. The Sikh attitude after Ranjit Singh was naturally, therefore, not one of willing cooperation as subordinate allies. True that in the post-Ranjit Singh years the darbar involved in its domestic troubles was incapable of grasping the implications of the Anglo-Sikh enterprise. For these reasons it was not surprising if it began to look upon the whole enterprise with fear and suspicion. The constant passage of British forces through the Punjab in the later stages hurt its national pride. The Kabul insurrection of 1841 lowered the prestige of the British in the eyes of the Sikhs. Above all, the darbar was entirely ill-placed to spend money on this expedition during these years when its own financial position was getting tight.

Altogether, the Treaty of 1833 was ill-conceived. It failed because of inherent defects in it which began to affect adversely the conduct of the struggle almost from the beginning. Secondly, the changing political conditions, which could not be anticipated, made things even more difficult. After the assassination of Shah Shuja in April 1842 the British thought of entering into a new treaty with the darbar. It was intended to safeguard the territorial interests of the Sikhs as before, provided the darbar agreed to recognize the same sovereign in Afghanistan as the British Government did'.¹ This proposal did not materialize as the darbar's territorial claims could not be determined according to its wishes; nor could the British agree to a joint control of foreign policy in respect of Afghanistan. However, when Amir Dost Mohd. went back to Afghanistan through Lahore after being released by the British, the darbar entered into a treaty with him which satisfied the Sikh territorial claims and promised various other concessions but it was clear from the very beginning that this treaty had no chance of being observed.²

We have to accept the view that the experience of the Tripartite Treaty in the post-Ranjit Singh period generated feelings of suspicion which were intensified subsequently by the policy of the British Government towards the Cis-Sutlej possessions of the darbar. It is possible, therefore, to assume that the first Afghan War created what was considered to be the Punjab problem. The internal situation of the darbar in which the army dominated, favoured a more abstract than pragmatic view of the Anglo-Sikh relations. Lacking the political acumen of Ranjit Singh who had a genius for compromise, the darbar encouraged the belief that the British had hostile designs. The only way in which these unfriendly intentions could be challenged was by taking military action. A defeat would no doubt compromise the darbar but there was no alternative. It was in such circumstances that the first Sikh War was launched.

1. Maddock to Clerk. 22nd July (Ind. Sec. Cons. 3rd Aug. 1842, No. 20)
1. Cf. Sohan Lai, *Umdat-ut-Twarikh*, Book IV, Part II. p. 6.

BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS THE PUNJAB

The conquest of Lahore by Ranjit Singh in 1799 coincided with the defeat of Sindia by General Lake in 1803. By this victory Delhi and Agra, and the person of the Mughal Emperor, a blind old man of eighty-three, were secured by the British. This victory opened up a new set of political problems. The Mughal Emperor came under British protection. The overlordship of the cities of Agra and Delhi pushed forward the British frontier to the upper waters of the Jamna which had hitherto functioned as the western boundary of British territory. But in spite of the British Government's policy at this time not to extend its protection to the Sikh Chiefs of Sirhind, events moved in the contrary direction. The Chiefs of Jind, Kaithal and Patiala preferred seeking British protection to being conquered by Ranjit Singh. The position crystallized rapidly under the impact of developments in Europe. The East India Company, which had, only a few years before, observed the policy of non-intervention towards chiefships, was now prepared to accept the policy of bringing the chiefs under its protection. This policy was coupled with the decision to develop friendly relations with a strong and stable government across the Sutlej. This was achieved by the Treaty of 1809. Ranjit Singh was no doubt balked in his Cis-Sutlej expansion but was given a free hand to conquer territories across the river. Lord Minto had sent missions to Iran and Afghanistan also to combat Napoleon's plan. A treaty was also concluded with the Amirs of Sindh. These alliances lost their immediate urgency by 1810 with the passing away of the French peril.

In the following decades the British government really evolved its policy towards the north-west across the Indus by different motives in which security, fear and European high politics dominated although it appeared that trade was responsible for the move to send Sir Alexander Burnes in 1831 to explore if the Indus was navigable. The danger from Russia's influence

over Iran urged the vital necessity of a second buffer in Afghanistan and the siege of Herat accelerated the pace of events which brought about Tripartite Treaty in 1838. After Dost Mohd. had failed to get back Peshawar diplomatically with the aid of the British and even by force, he began to look towards Persia and Russia for friendship. The British espoused the cause of Shah Shuja on the basis of Ranjit Singh's Treaty in 1833 with him. This triple alliance would help to achieve the second buffer in Afghanistan with the aid of the first in the Punjab.

The policy to develop a second buffer proved to be very costly and was pursued in the subsequent decades only in some modified form. The Afghans would not allow the presence of the British in their country. But the policy of retaining a strong and stable Punjab as a buffer remained in operation for many years, although many factors began to militate against it after Ranjit Singh's death. A stable government in the Punjab after Ranjit Singh became increasingly a doubtful proposition. However, the needs of the first Afghan War governed British policy towards the darbar during 1839-42. British interests required that the darbar should render its help freely without raising difficulties. Conditions should be created in which no objection should be raised to the passage through the Punjab of forces and equipment. It was necessary to give it all support to maintain its friendship. The British government was therefore inclined to recognize *de facto* government established at Lahore. Kunwar Nau Nihal Singh, who had ousted his father from authority, was at first opposed to giving permission to frequent passages of convoys through the Punjab, but agreed to this facility in the end though not without getting Wade, the Political Agent, transferred and George Clerk appointed in his place.¹

Clerk played a very important part in formulating British policy towards the Punjab. After the death of Kunwar Nau Nihal Singh Clerk was not really inclined to support Mai Chand Kaur's regency. He believed that Sher Singh would be better able to establish a strong government in the interest of the

1. Wade to Auckland, 14th Jan, (Ind. Sec. Cons. 4th May, 1840, No. 121)
Wade to Toriens, 27th Aug. 1839 (Ind. Sec. Cons. 6th April, 1840.

No, 71)

A'ghan campaign. The Governor-General required that Clerk should be more cautious and should do nothing to overturn the government of Mai Chand Kaur. When Sher Singh finally came to power after besieging the fort of Lahore, the course of British policy ran quite smoothly. Sher Singh had many difficulties. The army was getting out of control. The Mai intrigued against him by deputing Ajit Singh Sindhwalia to Clerk with a drastic proposal. If the British defeated Sher Singh the dyer and put her in power, she would give Kashmir or a four-anna share in the revenues, of the Punjab. In the latter case, the revenues of Kashmir were to go to Clerk. She even tempted the Agent by the suggestion that as Kunwar Nau Nihal Singh's, line was likely to end, there would be a good possibility to escheat the Punjab to British territory. Clerk used this offer of the Mai to keep Sher Singh under his thumb. He got his government to agree for a force of 10,000 to 12,000 men to be placed at his disposal to interfere in the Punjab, if necessary, in return for adequate and reasonable consideration on the ground that the mutinous troops might make things very difficult. He told Faqir Aziz-ud-Din who came to see him that the British government would be willing to help Sher Singh to restore order among the troops in consideration of Rs. 40 lakhs and the cession of Cis-Sutlej territory or Rs. 25 lakhs plus the actual cost of the campaign. The advantage of demanding the Cis-Sutlej territories, he argued with his government, lay not in their being profitable but because their possession would clearly define the British frontier placing all the ferries and forts under British control. Clerk was even prepared to interfere against the Dogras but the governor-General did not approve of this plan on the ground that the political situation in the Punjab was very fluid and the government should not take any initiative in effecting changes but should carefully watch the developments.¹

The position of Sher Singh improved as the intrigues of the Mai lessened and the troops became more amenable to discipline. In these circumstances, the British objective of obtaining the maximum help from the darbar after the Kabul insurrection

1. Clerk to Government, 21st Jan., 1841 (Ind. Sec. Cons. 1st Feb., 1841, No. 68)

of November 1841 was fully achieved. With the return of the British army from Afghanistan every one heaved a sigh of relief. Clerk, however, did not sit idle. He had so far held back the Sindhawalias south of the Sutlej but now he persuaded Sher Singh to receive them and to get reconciled to them. This step was calculated to reduce the power of the Dogras. Clerk fully realised what the consequences of this move might be.¹ In fact, he thought that the control of the Punjab situation was in his hands. He would be able to keep the Punjab together for sometime longer but not permanently. His own importance is indicated by a remark in a private letter to the Governor-General on the 28th April, 1843. "Ordinary vigilance on the part of the British Government may, if it be deemed more expedient, crumble it to pieces in a week, as I could have done any time these last four years by a mere sign of the head."² Clerk cannot be absolved of the blame for encouraging disintegration in the Lahore darbar and acting even against the pro-Dogra policy of his own government. But it appears that the British Government did not see these matters in that light at that time as it promoted Clerk to the position of Lt. Governor of the North-West Provinces.

Clerk's successor, Lt. Col. Richmond, was in the office when Sher Singh and Dhian Singh were assassinated in September 1843. Events now moved quickly towards the expected break-up. The troops were now more out of hand than ever before. It was realised, therefore, that Hira Singh would not be able to control the situation in Lahore for a long time. But the British Government adhered to its accepted policy of recognizing a strong *de facto* rule. At the same time it decided to strengthen the defence of its frontier at the line of the Sutlej. The Governor-General wrote, "while we will thus enforce our rights, we will respect those of others and without the least desire to interfere in their differences will let the inhabitants of this country (the Punjab) to settle their affairs as they think fit." The Sutlej frontier was declared to be inviolable. The Lahore darbar was

1. Clerk to Maddock, 7th April, (Ind. Sec. Cons. 29th June, 1842. No. 34)
2. Clerk to Ellenborough, Private 28th April, 1843, (Kipon Correspondence, Br. Mus. Add. Mss. 40864, pp. 212-13)

informed that "if one Sikh soldier crosses the Sutlej in hostility to the British quarter, the aggression will not be forgiven."

Apart from what apprehension this policy and the defensive measure caused in the minds of the Sikhs, another event occurred which compelled the British Government to take all possible measures to maintain its military strength on the frontier. This was the serious mutiny of the British Indian troops at Ferozepur in early 1844. It was feared that the presence of a rebellious army in the Punjab which was given higher pay would further the spirit of discontent among the British Indian troops, particularly the Purbias.

The mutiny of troops in Ferozepur made the British Government doubly careful in estimating the influence of the uncontrolled Sikh army. The frontier was put in a better state of defence by constructing a fort at Ferozepur and strengthening the one at Ludhiana.

The Lahore darbar's distrust of these as pure measures of defence was accentuated by the manner in which the British Government allowed the Raja of Nabha to resume the village of Moran from a dependent of the darbar. Secondly, the darbar was not given the treasure of 15 lakhs left by Raja Suchet Singh in spite of Ripon's view, "It may not be easy to find out who ought to have it : but I am sure that we ought not."

While Anglo-Sikh relations deteriorated in this manner, the darbar plunged further down into anarchy through a succession of political murders effected with the help of the army. With the removal of Hira Singh and Jalla in December 1844 the darbar lost what chance it held of realizing arrears of revenue from the sardars to meet its commitments to the army. As things began to look bad, Hardinge formulated his Punjab policy in clearer terms. The British would support a stable government in Lahore, but in no case he would interfere at the request of the sardars to destroy their rebellious army and establish a subsidiary alliance.¹ Nor was he prepared to negotiate

1. Governor-General in Council to Secret Committee, 8th Sep. 1885 (Ripon Correspondence, Br. Mus. Add. Mss. 40873, pp. 280-85)

with the army. He would meet the menace from the Lahore army by arranging to defend the frontier against any emergency. He had no doubt that if the Punjab could not remain Sikh, it must become British.¹ In no case should it be allowed to fall into the hands of a Muslim power from the north-west, for that would make India insecure.

Major Broadfoot, the new Political Agent, enforced his government's policy rather tactlessly because his own views were more drastic than the instructions he received. When the Lahore wakil enquired about the advance of British troops towards the frontier positions, he stated "that armies were kept to make war, if unhappily war became necessary". This tone under any conditions would inflame passion and not allay suspicions. In such circumstances the war was a foregone conclusion. In September 1845 the domination of the army resulted in the removal of Jawahar Singh, (the young Maharaja's uncle) who had been in position for eight or nine months.

As things began to be hot, Hardinge applied his mind more seriously to the Punjab problem. He was opposed to conquering and annexing the Punjab and throwing forward the British line of defence by more than three hundred miles from the Sutlej to the Indus. He realised that, apart from other reasons, government was influenced by financial considerations in view of the financial drain caused by the Afghan wars. Thus government was reluctant to engage in further costly wars. He hoped that the Punjab might become stable. He also feared that the darbar might excite their army to bring about a war. In the event of victory what would be done to the Punjab? A subsidiary alliance would throw the entire responsibility for defence against any rising of the Sikhs or any attacks from the north-west on the British. He was of the opinion that the Punjab should be occupied either by a Sikh army under an independent Sikh government or by a British force under British administration. His words are worth quoting :

'Assuming the Sikh army to be broken up and dispersed by our interference in Punjab affairs and the re-establishment

1, Hardinge to Ripon, 8th Jan. 1845 (Ripon Correspondence. Br, Mus. Add. Mss. 408716, pp. 24-29)

of a Sikh government be a helpless measure, it would be a system full of embarrassment and difficulty to govern the country by Sikh chiefs, independent in the exercise of their authority, retaining their nationality in the power of their misruling the country but deprived of the pride and glory of possessing a national army. These chiefs would soon feel the degradation of which the British Government would be the authors. Retaining a certain portion of power, they would soon be opposed to us in all their feelings and interests, and we have doubt frequent attempts would be made to throw off what to them would be so odious a joke'.¹

Ripon also visualised the conquest of the Punjab as a 'misfortune' leading to 'difficulty in the mode of administering the government of India. But the first Sikh War was fought and won within two months.

Hardinge believed that the terms of the Treaty involving loss of territory, reduction of the army and the presence of the British force were right 'for defensive, neutral and offensive objects'. These measures amounted to an intermediate course between annexation and a subsidiary alliance. If these measures failed, government would be compelled to resort to annexation for which in February 1846 his means were inadequate, but he hoped that his 'experiment' of establishing a darbar strong enough to protect itself but weakened in its resources to act offensively would succeed. An annexation will be more palatable to the Sikh pride when 'it should be gradually brought about by internal causes amongst themselves, than by British troops at the moment of victory.' The British Government in England, not yet aware of the decision made by the Governor-General, suggested taking the country up to the Ravi, dismembering the Punjab and bringing the dismembered portions under British protection. Hardinge replied that it was politic to keep an advance Sikh guard in the north-west as long as possible and to annex the country when such a step became impossible.

1. Governor-General in Council to Secret Comirittee, 8th Sept. 1845. (Ripon Correspondence, Br. Mus, Add, Mss. 40873, pp. 280-85)

The arrangement was satisfactory from the British point of view, but it is not at all possible to acquit Gulab Singh of treachery towards the darbar. The darbar expressed its resentment by making it difficult for the Raja to take over the possession of the new territories. Rapid disbandment of the troops could only be done by paying up their arrears to the troops. Shortage of funds obliged the Wazir Lai Singh to cut down jagirs and to realize arrears from the provincial governors. The negotiations with Mulraj of Multan presented a sordid picture of vested interests which had stood in the way for years. Lai Singh, by no means an ideal wazir, had become unpopular and when found guilty in his trial for obstructing the cession of Kashmir, was removed to Banaras unsung by anyone except perhaps by Rani Jindan.

The Punjab was in a bad way; there was no one capable of commanding the uniform support of all the sardars. Many of them favoured the view that British Government should take over complete charge of the Punjab during the minority of Dalip Singh. It was in these conditions that the Treaty of Bhairawal was concluded. A British force was stationed at Lahore for the protection of the Maharaja. The British Resident was put in complete charge of the civil and military administration. The Council of Regency, nominated by the Government, was responsible for the civil administration. This Treaty was the next step forward towards the final annexation of the Punjab. The British authorities in England as well as in the Governor-General hoped that the Council of Regency would work satisfactorily under the Resident but was this view sound? Had the British Government sufficient data on which to build such hopes? Would not the Sikhs and Sikh chiefs chafe at direct British interference and control? Would the sardars quietly agree to economies at their own expense, the kind of thing they had never done before? Would not the British autocracy come to be hated more than Lai Singh's as foreign and anti-national? Would the Rani dispossessed of power do nothing to oppose the British? In the answers to these questions lies criticism of Hardinge's policy and methods.

It is not possible to enter into a detailed working of the Residency during the next fifteen months. It was faced with the heavy task of adequately composing the army and keeping it contented, effecting administrative and judicial reforms, restoring financial stability and keeping the outlying frontier districts peaceful and orderly. But the presence of the British became irksome. The changes and reforms were reflected in the public mind as signs of the forth-coming annexation. The Resident and his British Assistants worked hard, but he found it increasingly difficult to work with the Council in which the sardars were divided.

Rani Jindan was removed from Lahore being the focus of discontents. It was believed that things were moving well, but Currie, the new Resident, wrote in early 1848 that rumours were afloat in the country "of a day coming when the Sikhs are again to be brought into collision with the British, and with a different result from the last"

Mulraj's conduct at Multan was considered by Currie to be the direct responsibility of the darbar to deal with. The troops of the darbar expressed their inability to deal with the insurrection at Multan. Finding the Commander-in-Chief unwilling to act until after the rains, Currie limited his efforts to preventing the rebellion from spreading beyond Multan. Jindan was deported from Sheikhpura to Banaras on the view that she was tempering with the darbar's troops. This measure roused Sher Singh and his troops to join Mulraj. Edwardes made an independent effort in combination with the Nawab of Bahawalpur to deal with Mulraj and his initial success persuaded Currie to direct help to him. Currie believed that the rebellion in Multan could be put down. To quote his words, "Reduce Multan, punish Mulraj and put down the rebellion, and the whole conspiracy will be at an end without the prospect of its revival/⁵¹

The siege of Multan lengthened out on account of Sher Singh's defection. Before long Chattar Singh, whose relations with Abbott in Hazara had been unsatisfactory, decided to

1. Currie to Elliot, 31st July and 8th Aug. (Ind. Sec. Cons. 7th oct. 1848, Nos. 325 and 432.)

throw in his lot with the rebels. In fact, the spirit of rebellion against the British was in evidence everywhere and all depended on the siege of Multan.

The rebellion of the Attariwalas had given a national colour to the rebellion. Dalhousie found evidence in the effort made by Bhai Maharaj in these happenings to support his view of a latent resentment among the Sikhs. He examined all the alternative courses of action and came to the conclusion that after the second Sikh War the correct thing to do was to annex the Punjab. Hardinge's 'experiment' of establishing a stable buffer had not succeeded and the only course open in the interest of security was to push the frontier to the Indus. If the Sikh darbar could be reconstituted, "it would be more dangerous than the Afghans against whom it had been cherished as a bulwark." The fact of Dost Muhammad having appeared on the scene convinced him of the Tightness of his step.

The British Government in England was not happy at the prospect of annexation. Dalhousie was utterly opposed to "calling the Punjab independent still, but making it by acts virtually own."¹ He was determined to wipe out all possibility of future trouble by disarming the country. He said "Men cannot make war with their finger nails; and if you let me, I will take care that even these shall be pared close/'²

Dalhousie has been severely criticised for the annexation. The greatest flaw in the situation was that the darbar had not rebelled as such and that the Resident had full control over its affairs and that the army had rebelled in spite of good treatment by the British. It is indeed difficult to see what constructive alternative was available except that of a subsidiary alliance to which British policy was opposed in the case of this frontier kingdom.

1. Broughten Selection, Br. Mus. Add. Mss. 36476, pp. 497—504.

2. *Idem*,

